Episode 3 – Special edition
Deep dive into the Japanese nuclear industry: a panorama
In the previous issue of this newsletter, we took a long look at the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP 10 years after the catastrophe, and examined the main impacts of the accident.
This event deeply transformed the Japanese nuclear landscape and the country now faces major hurdles regarding the implementation of its revised energy roadmap. In order to properly understand these obstacles, it is first necessary to grasp just how massive the Japanese nuclear industry actually is, which is what we will focus on in this issue.
The history
At the end of World War II, Japan is in shambles. During the following years, under guidance from the United States, the country shifts towards pacifism with a new constitution in which it explicitly renounces war and begins a rapid reconstruction of its economy. After less than 10 years of post-WWII hardships, the country entered a phase of strong economic growth, later dubbed the “Japanese miracle”, which lasted more than 30 years.
It is during this “boom” that the Japanese nuclear industry was born, after the government elevated it to the rank of national strategic priority. The first reactor on Japanese soil, Tokai 1, is a Magnox model imported from the United Kingdom, which went live in 1966. A few prototypes were later built, among which Fugen (moderated with heavy water, 1978) and Monju (sodium-cooled fast breeder, 1994), but Japan’s nuclear fleet ended up adopting the two American reactor designs, namely Westinghouse’s Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) and General Electric’s Boiling Water Reactor (BWR).
One of the biggest nuclear industries in the world
Before the 2011 catastrophe, the activity of Japan’s nuclear industry was roughly comparable to France’s. The power reactor fleet is made of about sixty units spread over slightly less than twenty plants. These NPPs are all located along Japan’s coastline.
The BWR technology is the most widespread, with 32 reactors (incl. Fukushima Daiichi’s) built by Toshiba and/or Hitachi. The remaining 24 PWRs were built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI). These three large Japanese companies are known as “makers” and are the backbone of the industry.
Unlike France, where EDF is the only operator of power reactors, Japan has about ten of these “EPCOs” (Electric Power Companies). Before 2011’s accident and its repercussions, TEPCO (Tokyo EPCO) was the largest nuclear operator in the country by far. Its main rival is KEPCO (Kansai EPCO), based in Osaka. It should be noted that these companies operate other types of power plants as well, the only exception being JAPC (Japan Atomic Power Company), a joint-venture specifically created by Japanese operators for nuclear purposes.
One interesting feature is the fact that these EPCOs are so-called “pure” operators, in the sense that these companies do not carry out studies or works themselves except through their subsidiaries. Most of the construction, maintenance or dismantling activities are entrusted to the “seller” initially selected by the operator. The Japanese nuclear industry is considered a very traditional one for cultural and historical reasons. One of the consequences of this status quo is that the market is divided into industrial networks that only rarely, if ever, collaborate. A very striking example of this is the fact that Japan’s electrical power grid uses two frequencies: 50 Hz in the east and 60 Hz in the west. This difference is a result of the purchase of non-identical electrical equipment at the end of the XIXth century, after which the stakeholders involved never managed to agree on the use of a common frequency. While this doesn’t really affect the daily life of the average citizen, it does mean that the power transfers between networks are limited, which is quite an issue in a country with little energy security and frequent and intense natural disasters.
Let’s continue this panorama of the key players in the field by mentioning the facilities dedicated to the fuel cycle and other research activities.
The JAEA (Japan Atomic Energy Agency) is the Japanese equivalent of the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA). It is a public society and the main organisation responsible for nuclear R&D in the country, with about fifteen research centres and institutes all over Japan. It also owns and operates fuel cycle and research facilities.
In order to properly grasp how big an organisation the JAEA is, its 2018 roadmap for spent fuel management identified 79 nuclear facilities that should be decommissioned over the next 70 years, including experimental reactors, hot laboratories and the Tokai fuel reprocessing plant, of which the complete decommissioning roadmap has been approved in 2018 (after determining that implementing the post-Fukushima safety upgrades would be too costly).
JNFL (Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited) is another key player. Its activities include the management of spent fuel (incl. enrichment), fuel reprocessing, MOx production but also temporary storage for spent fuel and high-level waste, storage for low-level waste and associated activities such as its transport.
If we wanted to draw a parallel with the French sector, JNFL would be a sort of Orano/ANDRA of which the shareholders would be the operators and industrial companies involved in the Japanese nuclear energy sector. JNFL’s role may well gain in importance in the future for matters regarding waste management, the exception being deep geological repositories. This mission has been entrusted to another organisation called NUMO (Nuclear Waste Management Organization). It should be noted that the issue of nuclear waste management in Japan is a particularly challenging topic which might even be worthy of a deep dive in a later issue of this newsletter. JNFL’s flagship is the Rokkasho facility, the “Japanese La Hague”, located in the north of the main island of the archipelago, Honshu. This facility will be used to produce J-MOx, the Japanese mixed fuel, but also to reprocess spent fuel and vitrify waste. JNFL announced back in December 2020 that the start of operations would be delayed once more, with a new scheduled start in late 2024.
The stakes in 2021
Historically, the Japanese nuclear industry is a heavyweight. However, restarting the nuclear fleet proves to be an extremely complicated issue, especially with a public opinion that deteriorated strongly.
The main short-term goal is the 2030 energy roadmap, which the Japanese government is legally required to update before the end of 2021.
The next issue of this newsletter will therefore be a good opportunity to present the importance given to nuclear energy in this roadmap and the sector’s key priorities.